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Efficient causation and neuroscientific 
explanations of criminal acts 
 
 




In recent years, legal scholars have looked to the brain and behavioural sciences to 
help in delimiting criminal behaviour. But what do the lawyers want from the 
neuroscientists? And are the scientists in a position to deliver the goods? In this chapter I will 
explore what the neurosciences can offer legal analysis, and will discuss the practical and 
theoretical limits we will face in looking for the roots of criminal action. In particular I will 
look at the extent to which we can ascribe intent to a person’s action, and whether 
neuroscience can offer anything legally relevant to this fundamental question. 
How should we understand the intention behind a person’s actions? It is a requirement 
of criminal law that a person should intend an act to occur, in order for the act to be 
malicious; this is the principle famously set down by Edward Coke: “actus non facit reum 
nisi mens sit rea”, the act is not guilty unless the mind is also guilty). Where then do we look 
for the malicious intent? Recently legal scholars have looked to psychology and the 
neurosciences for guidance in interpreting the behaviour and motivation of a person who has 
committed an act. However we need to find the appropriate level at which to talk about 
psychological constructs that are of relevance to the law. Does it make sense to talk about the 
                                                 
1 Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. I am grateful to Prof. Bebhinn 
Donnelly-Lazarov for helpful comments. 
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passage of individual action potentials along the axon of a neuron? Or should we talk more 
abstractly about higher-level goals? Dennis Patterson2 has argued for the latter position, that 
we should talk in terms of reasons for action. I will examine this view, and present an 
argument based on what is currently known about the neuroscience of intention. 
 
Mens rea and actus reus 
The law has from its earliest days had a dual approach to action. A person must have 
committed an act, and must also have intended to commit that act. If a person is behind the 
wheel of a car that injures a pedestrian, she has surely committed an injurious act – an actus 
reus. But for the driver to be criminally liable she must have caused the act. For this latter 
condition the driver must have acted through intention, for example by choosing to drive after 
drinking alcohol or by choosing to drive with excessive speed. This choice, the mens rea, 
must be demonstrated if the driver is to be found liable for the injury to the pedestrian. It is 
possible to have each of these two components separately: the driver’s car may have mounted 
the pavement after being struck by another car (actus reus but no mens rea), or the driver 
may have left the house that day with the intention of running over her ex-partner but decided 
against it at the last moment (mens rea but not followed through with actus reus). Similarly, 
the offensive act could be one of omission (failing to maintain the car’s brakes) or one of 
possession (if one defines unlawful possession as an act). In any case there must be a 
deliberateness to the person’s act for the person to hold liability. I will not deal further with 
acts of omission here, since the principles apply equally to deliberately acting as to 
deliberately non-acting. I will also not deal with offensive acts caused by recklessness, which 
also count as acts in mens rea. 
                                                 
2 Dennis Patterson, ‘Neuroscience and the explanation of human action’, this volume. 
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For legal purposes, an ‘act’ has a fairly clear definition. A person’s bodily movement, 
whether intended or involuntary, must lead to the harmful situation. This movement could be 
a gross motor act such as a kick, a punch or a tilt of a steering wheel, or could be a movement 
of the vocal apparatus or the typing fingers, in the case of offenses of language. In any case, 
an overt change of the person’s bodily state must lead to the harm, even when the harm is 
separated in time or directness from the act3. This definition protects cognitive liberty, which 
is the freedom to think whatever one pleases – as long as no illegal act results from those 
thoughts4. Although there are some toothsome scholarly arguments around whether some acts 
truly count as acts5, it is generally clear when a person’s body has caused an event to occur. 
However the body may not always be under the person’s control, and involuntary 
movements such as tics or spasms, and acts committed while asleep or unconscious do not 
generally occasion legal liability, unless the person knowingly neglected to prevent those 
movements (such as if a person neglected to take medication that would suppress spasms). 
What is missing therefore is the sense of mental causation of the act, or the sense that the 
person intended the act to occur. This is the commonly agreed definition of mens rea: the 
intention or foreknowledge that a given act would be likely to cause a given harm. 
                                                 
3 In Thabo Meli and Others vs R [1954] 1 WLR 228 (PC), the appellants were found to have killed a man, not 
through a blow to the head, which the victim survived, but from the attempt to dispose of (what they 
believed to be) the corpse by rolling it off a cliff. Rolling a dead body off a cliff does not constitute murder, 
but the chain of the day’s events included acts intended to kill. So coincidence of cause and effect may be 
flexible. 
4 J-C Bublitz, ‘My mind is mine?! Cognitive liberty as a legal concept’. In E. Hildt & A. Francke (Eds.), 
Cognitive Enhancement (Springer, 2013). 
5 In a  famous example, the aforementioned Edward Coke unsuccessfully defended the preacher Edmund 
Peacham, who was found in possession of a sermon which had never been, and apparently would never be, 
delivered: The Case of Edmund Peacham (1615) 2 How. St. Tr. 869.  
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So where does that mental intention come from? Here I will examine the arguments 
that link mental causation to the physical properties of the person and her environment, and 
will review the ways in which the new neurosciences help us to understand how to ground the 
metaphysical theories in the functions of the brain and body. 
 
The philosophical status of neuroscience 
Most modern neuroscientists would consider themselves heirs to the tradition of 
materialism. That is, all phenomena in existence, including mental processes, arise solely 
from the properties of matter. A materialist would hold that there is no need to invoke a 
higher power or spirit to explain our inner life, and that a full understanding of mental 
process will eventually come from understanding the properties of the matter that constitutes 
the person. This materialism stands in contrast to the dualism of philosophers such as Rene 
Descartes, who could not reconcile material and mental phenomena. A practical problem in 
dualism is in explaining how non-material phenomena are able to influence the physical 
apparatus of the brain and thereby the body. Descartes chose the pineal gland as the site in the 
body where non-material mental processes interact with the physical body. But locating a 
location in the brain is not the same as identifying a process, and there still do not appear to 
be any good theories in the dualist tradition of how material and non-material phenomena 
interact. 
Modern materialism is more properly called physicalism, with the different name 
acknowledging that there is more to the physical realm than the matter itself. The interactions 
among material phenomena also contribute to the functions of the system. So a computer 
processor can be understood in terms of the lattice of gates that is etched into it, but the true 
nature of the processor is only revealed when the gates are configured to run a program. A 
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complete physicalist theory of mental processes may possibly draw on the electromagnetic 
properties of the cells that constitute the body, on the dynamics of thermal or metabolic 
transport around those cells, or on the relationship between the person and the surrounding 
environment. Although physicalism is somewhat difficult to define6, there is at least the 
general sense that the physical laws of the universe contain within them the basis for all 
physical and mental phenomena. 
A conundrum in modern neuroscience is the status of determinism. Determinism is 
the philosophical position that the current state of any system (the brain, the plumbing, or the 
whole universe) is completely determined by its state immediately prior. That is, if we could 
know everything about the state of the brain in one instant, including the position and 
momentum of every particle, we could in principle know how the state of the brain will 
unfold over time, and could therefore predict how the person will act at all times in the 
future7. Whilst there are of course practical and physical barriers to complete knowledge of a 
system like the brain, such as the famous uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics, true 
determinism excludes the idea of uncaused events. However these uncaused events are 
precisely what free will requires, since otherwise the future choices of the brain would be 
completely constrained by the developing state. 
 
                                                 
6 A. Ney, ‘Defining physicalism’ (2008) 3/5 Philosophy Compass 1033-1048 
7 This is a gross oversimplification, of course. Rummens and Cuypers pick this apart, establishing that there are 
different forms of predictability, and suggesting that human agency allows for a certain degree of control 
over some forms of determinism. See S. Rummens and S. Cuypers, ‘Determinism and the paradox of 
predictability’ (2010) 72 Erkenn 233-249 
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Physicalism and physical incompleteness 
The physicalist approach to intention treats the physical realm as a closed system, in 
that all phenomena exist within the system and are sustained by the system. So for this to be 
true we must find an explanation for mental phenomena that arises within the system, and 
does not require an external intervention. An argument against physicalist approaches is that 
there does not seem to be a good way to start doing this within our current knowledge of the 
physical universe. David Chalmers famously drew the distinction between the ‘easy 
problems’ of the philosophy of mind, which are usually problems that can be put as questions 
of physiology or information processing, and the ‘hard problems’ of the sense of perception 
and cognition, for which we do not have a good way to frame a question in physical terms8. 
 
 
Why is a neuroscientific explanation attractive? 
Many legal scholars are now turning to the neurosciences to reduce the uncertainties 
in legal processes. Despite the problems that neuroscience faces in defining the proper 
substrate for analysis, nevertheless there is a body of knowledge in the brain sciences, and a 
set of methods for developing ideas, that may add significantly to the legal analysis of 
specific cases. Neuroscience has value in understanding a person’s motivations, and in 
determining a proper outcome for an individual. 
 
                                                 
8 D. Chalmers, ‘Facing up to the problem of consciousness’ (1995) 2 Journal of Consciousness Studies 200-219 
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Mitigation and treatment 
Neuroscience can help us to understand when we must act compassionately towards a 
person who needs help more than they need punishment. The nature and the severity of many 
crimes may indicate that a person should be committed for treatment for their own good and 
for the good of others. For example, the M’Naghten Rules of the 1840s allow courts to test 
the state of mind of a defendant at the time of the act, based on the following principle: 
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved 
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was 
doing what was wrong.9 
The field of biological psychology offers some insights into the range of factors that 
may bias an otherwise healthy person towards certain types of behaviour. It is known that the 
personality dimensions of Conscientiousness and Neuroticism are moderately heritable10, 
suggesting a degree of predetermination in our actions: a person who regularly experiences 
worry and anger may have inherited a predisposition for these emotions from their parents. 
Intelligence and socio-economic status share both genetic and environmental determination, 
although these factors may be mitigated through education. 
                                                 
9 M’Naghten’s case (1843) 10 Cl & F 200. 
10 R. Riemann, A. Angerleitner and J. Strelau, ‘Genetic and environmental influences on personality: A study of 




None of the factors listed here have probative value, however a compassionate judge 
may incorporate evidence from medical and scientific experts to understand how 
predisposing circumstances may mitigate to wrongness of an act. For example: 
When a neurological test can demonstrate that a defendant’s thought process 
does not operate as one a judge would normally encounter - whether that is due to 
diminished culpability or a brain injury - a judge could consider that information, 
counteracting any implicit biases she may be holding about the defendant’s obvious 
characteristics.11 
I will return below to the issue of bias, but the hope here is that some kind of 
measurement of a person’s brain state or mind state might help in arriving at an appropriate 




The factors described above are in a sense post hoc, in that a person must have 
committed an act before we can worry about them. However modern neuroscience allows us 
to delve deeper into the intentional quality of action. Figure 1 shows a schematic version of a 
famous experiment in neuroscience, the so-called Libet Clock. Libet asked participants to 
press a key on a computer at a time of their choosing, and to report what time was on the 
                                                 
11 B. Donald and E. Bakies, ‘A glimpse inside the brain's black box: Understanding the role of neuroscience in 
criminal sentencing’ (2016) 85 Fordham Law Review 481-502 at 500. 
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clock when the participant “felt the will to move” (called the W-judgement)12. The 
participants consistently reported that the time of the W-judgement occurred before the time 
of the actual key-press, which would of course be necessary as the intention must precede the 
act. However Libet’s experiment revealed something more interesting: the activity of the 
brain showed a clear shift ahead of the W-judgement, measurable up to half a second before 
the key-press. Since this shift in activity preceded the participants’ experience of deciding to 
press the key, many scientists and philosophers have taken this as evidence that our sense of 
intention is no more than the conscious brain developing a post hoc explanation for an action 
that the non-conscious brain has already decided. Variants of Libet’s original experiment 
have confirmed the basic premise, that brain activity changes before the ‘decision’ to act, and 
sophisticated neuroimaging can detect activity up to ten seconds before a free choice that 
accurately predicts that choice13. 
 
Seductive allure 
It must be admitted that there remains a certain attraction in pinning messy legal 
realities onto a seemingly clean scientific field such as neuroscience. In fact, the so-called 
“seductive allure” of the neurosciences may bias people into believing evidence without 
properly questioning it, which would undermine the use of such evidence in court14. 
                                                 
12 B. Libet, C. A. Gleason, E. W. Wright and D. K. Pearl, ‘Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset 
of cerebral activity (readiness-potential) the unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act’ (1983) 106 
Brain 623-642 
13 C. S. Soon, M. Brass, H. J. Heinze and J. D. Haynes, ‘Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the 
human brain’ (2008) 11 Nature Neuroscience 543-545 
14 Classically this was reported by D. Weisberg, F. Keil, J. Goodstein, E. Rawson and J. Gray, ‘The seductive 
allure of neuroscience explanations’ (2008) 20 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 470-477, but see also D. 
P. McCabe and A. D. Castel, ‘Seeing is believing: the effect of brain images on judgments of scientific 
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Although there is some doubt about the solidity of this finding15, nevertheless there is 
something evocative about brain images that lends credibility to the facts of a case. This is 
not unique to the brain sciences of course: many miscarriages of justice have occurred 
because courts have been poorly equipped to properly examine scientific evidence presented 
by expert witnesses. 
However the allure of the brain sciences, and the seeming solidity of the evidence and 
its presentation, induces a false confidence in people who handle such evidence. For example, 
the following passage was written by an American judge and a legal clerk (emphasis mine): 
Without disregarding the criminal justice system’s ability to hold those 
accountable for their actions, neuroscience can be utilized to demonstrate that certain 
actions may actually be the result of developmental problems associated with the 
brain, like the effects of complex trauma on children. A judge may also use 
neuroscience to combat her implicit biases, which have ways of manifesting 
themselves in the courtroom and therefore need to be explicitly acknowledged. 
Neuroscience can offer additional insight into a defendant’s thought process and 
accordingly provide a means for the judge to address and correct those biases.16 
I would argue that reliance on neuroscientific evidence is itself a source of bias. No 
scientific fact is beyond questioning, and we should be as prepared to acknowledge and to 
                                                 
reasoning’ (2008) 107 Cognition 343-352, and D. Weisberg, J. Taylor and E. Hopkins, ‘Deconstructing the 
seductive allure of neuroscience explanations’ (2015) 10 Decision Making 429-44. 
15 Some methodological and other concerns were raised by M. Farah and C. Hook, ‘The seductive allure of 
“seductive allure”’ (2013) 8 Perspectives on Psychological Science 88-90 
16 Donald and Bakies, supra note 11, at 482. 
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challenge neuroscience evidence as we are to challenge evidence from bite marks or from 
DNA17. 
Given the newness of the relationship between the law and the neurosciences, there is 
a responsibility to get this right from the outset. Counsel must be given the confidence to 
present, and to challenge, evidence derived from the brain sciences, and expert witnesses 
must ensure that evidence presented in court is digestible without being overly simplified. 
 
Practical problems in finding neuroscientific explanations 
The previous section sounds rather optimistic. The neurosciences can tell us so much 
about predisposition and intention, so why do we not hand over judicial decisions to the 
scientists? There are several practical problems in reading brain states and in relating brain 
states to mind states. 
 
Complexity and redundancy in the brain 
FIGURE 2 
There are currently significant gaps in our knowledge of how action plans arise in the 
brain and are thereby enacted. The neuroanatomy of the motor system is well known. The 
primary motor cortex, lying in a strip at the back end of the frontal cortex, projects to the 
spinal cord, and from there to the muscles. Although there are some controversies about 
                                                 
17 For concerns around the use of bite marks, see G. V. Reesu and N. L. Brown, ‘Inconsistency in opinions of 
forensic odontologists when considering bite mark evidence (2016) 266 Forensic Science International 263-
270. There is a readable account of problems with DNA evidence in P. A. Smith, ‘When DNA implicates the 
innocent’ (2016) 314 Scientific American 11-12. 
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exactly how information is processed in the primary motor cortex18, there are helpful 
regularities such as a somatotopic mapping from brain areas to muscles, meaning that 
changes in activity measured in these areas have a predictable and predictive relationship 
with changes measured in the muscles. ‘Upstream’ of the primary motor cortex it becomes 
increasingly difficult to separate clear motor information from cognitive function. The higher 
motor areas of the premotor cortex (PMC) and the supplementary motor area (SMA) deal 
with higher-order plans related to goals and motivations, rather than to specific actions. The 
motor areas of the brain are shown in Figure 2. The experiments of Libet and Haynes and 
others, mentioned above, took place under rigidly controlled conditions and with detailed and 
accurate knowledge of the state of the brain before and after any decision was undertaken. In 
the real (legal) world we have no such conditions, and no such certainty around the outcomes 
that we see. 
The complexity of the brain adds another problem. Like many complex systems, 
including the Internet, termite colonies and financial economies, the brain exploits 
redundancy and plasticity to afford robustness against external attacks. We see this in people 
who have suffered a stroke. Even when a section of the cortex is damaged by the injury, the 
function that is subserved by the affected area may be preserved as the brain reorganises and 
relearns. This issue goes to the heart of what Patterson19 describes as efficient causation in the 
neurolegal sense. It is simply not possible to identify a single causal chain of events in the 
brain that leads to a given outcome. 
 
                                                 
18 N. J. Davis, S. P. Tomlinson and H. M. Morgan, ‘The role of beta-frequency oscillations in motor control’ 
(2012) 32 Journal of Neuroscience 403-404 




Philosophical problems in finding neuroscientific explanations 
Traditions in neuroscience 
So far I have been careful around making the obvious link between the mind and the 
brain. There is no question that the brain is the centre of all mental processes. Damage to the 
brain is clearly linked to altered mental processing, and even Descartes looked in the brain for 
the seat of his dualist interactions. However it would not be accurate to suggest that the brain 
is the closed system that we are looking for. The most obvious point is that the brain does not 
exist on its own, but is connected via a variety of tissues to the sensory organs, to the 
muscles, and to the internal organs of the body. In a trivial sense, the brain is crucially 
situated in the body, and is immersed in the sensory milieu. Notwithstanding philosophical 
conundrums such as the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment of Gilbert Harman20, the brain is 
part of the body and is indivisible from it. 
A branch of behavioural psychology suggests that not only should we consider the 
brain in the context of the whole body, but further that the functions of the brain and body 
only make sense in relation to the flow of information passing around and through them. This 
field of ecological psychology observes that all of the information needed to behave freely in 
the world is available directly from the sensory arrays, and that little, if any, information 
needs to be stored in a memory representation21. Extending this further, the programme of 
embodied cognition seeks to understand mental function in relation to the environment and to 
                                                 
20 This was a neat thought experiment devised by Harman in G. Harman, Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), and was developed by Hilary Putnam in H. Putnam, Reason, truth and history 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
21 J. J. Gibson, The ecological approach to visual perception (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1979) 
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available behaviours22. For example, mentally rotating an image of a hand is faster than 
mentally rotating an image of blocks, which is consistent with our familiarity with our own 
hands23. 
The difference between many fields of cognitive science comes down to what quality 
of the universe is being minimised or maximised. Many researchers who study the motor 
system believe that movement errors should be minimised24, while those who study the 
sensory systems believe that some measure of sensory fidelity should be maximised25. The 
ecological branch focuses on the amount of information processing that is needed, believing 
that it is wasteful for the brain to simulate or calculate information that is cheaply available in 
the environment26. 
 
The disunity of neuroscience 
All this is to say that the proper substance of neuroscientific analysis has not been 
sufficiently established. Researchers in different fields, or in different traditions, look at the 
cognitive architecture of the brain and see different things. Many other researchers are less 
concerned with the information processing within the brain, as they are with the tools they 
have for extracting that information. People who study language functions almost invariably 
use electroencephalography (EEG), while those who study brain-wide cognitive of memory 
                                                 
22 E. Thompson and F. Varela, ‘Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness’ (2001) 5 Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 418-425 
23 S. Kosslyn, G. DiGirolamo, W. Thompson and N. Alpert, ‘Mental rotation of objects versus hands: Neural 
mechanisms revealed by positron emission tomography’ (1998) 35 Psychophysiology 151-161 
24 C. Harris and D. Wolpert, ‘Signal-dependent noise determines motor planning’ (1998) 394 Nature 780-784  
25 D. C. Knill and A. Pouget, ‘The Bayesian brain: the role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation’ 
(2004) 27 Trends in Neurosciences 712-719 
26 D. N. Lee and P. Reddish, ‘Plummeting gannets: a paradigm of ecological optics’ (1981) 293 Nature 293-294 
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processes may reach for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The wholeness of 
our understanding of the brain and its activity is threatened by the disparity between the 
methods and the theories used to understand it. 
Can there be unity in the fields of behaviour and neuroscience? I believe there can. 
The philosophical bedrock comes from the notion that we live in a computable universe 
where systems progress according to lawful rules27. Those rules come from the laws of 
physics, and particularly the laws that apply at the scale of our body size, and to the 
substances that compose our bodies. For example, Fick’s laws describe the diffusion of 
chemicals in a fluid, Maxwell’s equations relate different forms of electromagnetic energy, 
and Boltzmann (following Newton) developed a basis for understanding entropy. With these 
laws in place, and a sense of their dynamics, we have the basis for understanding brain 
processes in relation to each other, which is the beginnings of a theory. However there is 
some considerable work to be done to get to that point. 
 
Possible solutions 
The need for better neuroscience 
Where does this epistemic obstacle course leave us? Many of the issues raised are 
practical ones, and the solution may lie in better technology and better theories. Pushing the 
envelope of brain imaging allows us to see intentions develop, several seconds before 
action28. Another solution may be to attack the problem from another angle. The same 
advances in neuroimaging that showed us the anatomy of intention may also be used to probe 
                                                 
27 D. Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality (London: Penguin Books, 1997). 
28 Soon et al., supra note 13 
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the content of memory. The field of lie-detection is relatively well-established, but is held 
back by the legal and moral questions around extracting the true state of another person’s 
mind. The right to cognitive integrity is thought by many to be just as strong a human right as 
the right to bodily integrity, the violation of which is treated with the utmost seriousness in 
most jurisdictions. 
 
Abstraction and emergence 
We may also learn from the fields of science that deal daily with the most complex 
systems. The science of the climate is just such a field. The large-scale weather systems that 
gyre across the oceans are the result of uncountably many uncountably tiny interactions 
among molecules of water and gas and the rays of the sun. Yet we can ask simple, direct 
questions of them, such as: “should I wear a coat on Sunday”, or: “will there be snow at 
Christmas”. The weather scientists add all available information into their computers, and 
deliver their verdict: “unlikely to be necessary”, or: “80% probable”. People who ask and 
answer questions at the level of clothing decisions do not need to know the physical 
properties of water, or the likelihood of every possible interaction between every molecule of 
water and every possible solar ray that passes through the atmosphere. Instead we are 
comfortable with the statistical nature of the physical processes, and with the probabilistic 
nature of the predictions that arise from them. Similarly, we do not need to know the exact 
pathway of every neuron in a person’s brain, nor the distribution of neurotransmitters and 
peptides, to know whether our friend is sad to have ended her relationship with her girlfriend. 
Again we are comfortable with approximations and probabilities. In both of these cases we 
develop an appropriate level of abstraction that suits the form of the question we want to ask. 
This does not deny the ‘truth’ of the most detailed level of analysis, but serves to remind us 
17 
 
that most human cognition operates at a level of abstraction that might best be termed 
“beyond reasonable doubt”. 
The above touches on what has become known as emergence, or the notion that the 
proper level of analysis is not the tiniest level of physical detail, but at a higher level, where 
matter and forces interact lawfully to produce larger-scale effects. As John Blodwell29 puts it: 
There is an underlying, unspoken assumption about what has come to count 
for us as existential bedrock, namely that at bottom ‘reality’ is stuff in space, evolving 
and interacting in accordance with the laws of physics. […] Ontological status then 
favours objects rather than operations. 
However Blodwell argues that mental phenomena are not properties of the 
constituents of the brain (neurons, glia, cerebrospinal fluid, etc.) but of the interactions 
among those parts. These phenomena emerge when the parts communicate with each other. 
Crucial to the discussion of emergence is the sense that the emergent phenomena are 
stable in some way. We are happy to believe that the ‘person’ (collection of cells and fluids 
collected within a matrix of skin and clothes) who stands in court bears some relation to the 
‘person’ (collection of cells, etc.) that existed at the time of a supposed crime. And further 
that the same collection of cells will emerge from a period of corrective detention, chastened 
but improved. This temporal coherence gives meaning to dynamic systems such as 
personhood or cognitive processing. 
 
                                                 




Patterson has argued that the above examples focus on an inappropriate level of detail. 
Instead, the philosophical constructs of reasons are the best level on which to consider issues 
of motivation. What are reasons (in this context)? Robert Audi30 defines a range of different 
types of reasons, which cover the different senses in which people mean the term. However 
the classes of reasons which concern us here are normative reasons and explanatory reasons. 
Normative, or justifying, reasons are reasons that make it sensible or likely that a person will 
act in a certain way. So the reason why I check if my dinner guests may be vegetarian is 
normative: I would not want to offend someone by presenting her with a steak if she does not 
eat meat. Actions result from a weighing up of the positive and negative normative reasons 
for those actions. By contrast, explanatory reasons are the reasons that led the person to 
commit the act. These are the causes (the Aristotelean efficient causes as Patterson notes) of 
the action by that specific person on that specific day.  
Audi later31 develops and elaborates the notion of reasons, relating them to different 
conceptions of moral virtue, or understanding the chains of reasoning (or schemata) that 
derive from basic reasons. However a limitation of the use of reasons in considering human 
behaviour is that they are opaque to external observers. The person who possesses the reason 
may have rational and well-justified reasons for her behaviour, but we still need that person 
to tell us what they are. So normative reasons may be guessed at from the time or the culture 
in which a person lives, but the explanatory reasons for a specific act may not be obvious 
unless a person chooses to reveal them. 
                                                 
30 R. Audi, ‘Acting for reasons’ (1986) 95 The Philosophical Review, 511-546 
31 R. Audi, Reasons, Rights, and Values (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 
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Reasons are not, therefore, a directly helpful way to judge mens rea. Could they have 
any other uses? Examination of a person’s reasons for action may reveal that a person 
believed they had acted on behalf of God, or in the cause of preserving the racial ‘purity’ of 
the nation. Neither of these is a good reason (or rather, an exculpatory reason), but the court 




Dennis Patterson32 argues that the appropriate level of analysis for criminal 
neuroscience is that of reasons. I agree with Patterson that current neuroscientific 
explanations of action are unsatisfying, but I would further suggest that we keep trying. 
Steering away from physicalist explanations does not solve the problem the legal system has 
wrestled with for centuries: whether a person possessed a guilty intention (mens rea) at the 
time when they committed a guilty act (actus reus). 
Law and neuroscience are natural friends. Legal scholars will find it profitable to 
understand the basis of voluntary action, and its underpinnings in the brain. However the 
lawyers must also understand the limits of current understanding about the functions of the 
brain, both in terms of the technological limits of the machines we use to probe the brain, but 
also in terms of the questions we are able to ask of the brain. Conversely the scientists will 
benefit greatly from contact with a field in which their knowledge can be properly applied, 
since new relationships breed new questions, and constant questioning is what drives science 
to improve. For their part, scientists must remain open to these enquiries, and must provide 
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answers that engage with the question without skipping detail and without implying certainty 
or consensus. The so-called “seductive allure” of brain-based explanations may introduce 
bias to legal proceedings without adding to the scientific value, and to do so devalues the law 
and the neurosciences. 
At the start of this chapter I asked what it was that lawyers want from the 
neurosciences, and whether the scientists were able to provide what is asked of them. 
Criminal law has one major question to ask of neuroscience: did this person intend to commit 
this act? Several additional questions may result from this one, such as: what was the 
person’s state of mind during the act? Or: has this person truly conquered her addiction, and 
so is less likely to offend again? However the question of pure intention is the big one. 
Neuroscience is not equipped to answer this question yet. The roots of intentional behaviour 
undoubtedly lie in the brain, but extracting that signal from the vast architecture of the brain 
is certainly beyond current technology, and may possibly be the wrong question to ask. 
Asking people to ‘intend’ in a lab, as in the paradigms of Benjamin Libet, or of Soon et al., 
reveal a network of brain areas that work together at different stages of the process. However 
none of these answer the more legally-relevant post hoc question: for the act that was 
committed by this person, did the person intend or not intend the outcome? Now the question 
becomes one of truth-detection, and again the neurosciences do not have a good, reliable 
means of separating truthful from deceitful responses. So the scientists cannot do what the 
lawyers seem to want of them: to answer the question of mens rea. 
Neuroscience undoubtedly has much to offer the legal system. But in cases of 
criminal law, science can offer very little to aid the court. There seems little alternative but to 
continue to rely on the time-honoured system of judging each case on the best available 











Legend: In the classic experiments of Benjamin Libet (e.g. Libet et al., 1983, at note 
12), a participant is asked to press a key whenever he or she “feels the urge (or the will) to 
move”. The participant is asked to note the time shown on the clock face at the time of the 
‘will’ – this is known as the W-judgement. The Bereitschaftspotential (BP), which is a 
measure of the electrical activity of the brain around the time of movement, shows a 
deflection leading up to the time of an action (the button-press), at which point the potential 
returns to baseline. The W-judgement precedes the movement, as we would expect. However 
the key finding of Libet’s work is that the BP begins its deflection some hundreds of 
milliseconds prior to the time when the participant thought they had decided to move. This is 
taken by some as evidence that ‘free will’ is no more than post hoc rationalising by ne are of 









LEGEND: The key motor-related areas of the brain. The primary motor cortex (M1) 
is the principal outflow of information to the muscles. However other areas are involved in 
planning actions (dorsolateral prefrontal areas and the posterior parietal cortex), and still 
others are involved in translating these plans into muscle dynamics (supplementary motor 
area, premotor cortex). The cerebellum and the primary somatosensory cortex (S1) monitor 
and guide ongoing action. The large amount of real estate devoted to action planning and 
coordination points to the complexity of information processing relating to action in the 
brain. 
